Numerous studies find that people do not fully account for base rate information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) , give undue weight to salient examples (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992; Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) , have a poor understanding of small numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) , and rely on stereotypes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) when estimating their risk. Undoubtedly, these errors in thinking contributed to an overestimation of personal risk of being attacked. In this thesis I
propose an additional reason people might overestimate their risk. Specifically, I propose that in some instances people may overestimate their risk to avoid negative feelings such as disappointment associated with having bad events come as a surprise. That is, people may overestimate their risk by making unduly pessimistic predictions in an attempt to "brace for the worst" (Carroll, Dockery, & Shepperd, 2003) . The pessimism of residents of the Washington DC area about the risk of a sniper attack may have been motivated in part by an attempt to brace for the worst possible scenario. In fact, people who are bracing themselves may consistently overestimate the risk of rare events in their effort to prepare themselves for the blow of a negative outcome.
This research examines whether the commonality of an event moderates bracing. I specifically address whether people brace more for rare events or for common events.
On the one hand, people may brace more in anticipation of negative events that are common because of the greater objective likelihood of experiencing common event, which prompts more worry and fear of disappointment. For example, during an epidemic when large numbers of people are testing positive for a disease, people objectively face a greater risk of catching the disease and thus should be more preoccupied with the disease.
In contrast, people should be less concerned about a rare disease for which their objective risk is lower. Thus, one might expect that people are more pessimistic, relative to the base rate, about common negative events. On the other hand, it is also possible that people brace more in anticipation of negative events that are rare. Research shows that the intensity of disappointment depends on the unexpectedness of a negative event. The more unexpected the event, the greater the disappointment people experience (van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 1999) . Because bracing serves to reduce or avoid negative feelings such as disappointment, people may be more inclined to brace for rare events, which have greater capacity for producing disappointment, than for common events.
Indeed, people may not only brace more for rare events, they may also prepare more in other ways, a finding that would have important implications regarding risk-taking behaviors. For example, travelers who mistakenly believe that they are likely to crash in a plane may take to the far more dangerous highways. The current study tests the competing possibilities regarding the influence of commonality on bracing.
Judging Likelihood
Although people often attempt to predict future outcomes (e.g., the likelihood that rain will spoil a picnic, that stock prices will rise, that traffic will be lighter on one route or another), try as they might they often predict inaccurately (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . In fact, people often fail to adequately consider information about the actual frequency of an event, or its base rate. The base rate for an event, or more accurately, people's perception of the base rate, can influence estimates of an event's likelihood.
However, people are often unaware of the base rate for an event, and even available base rate information does not guarantee accurate estimates. People often neglect such information, attending instead to less informative details of a situation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) .
This phenomenon is related to the process of anchoring and adjustment, another example of base rate use in probability judgments. When people employ the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, they make estimations by accounting for present information and then adjusting for differentiating characteristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) .
Although anchoring and adjustment can lead to better predictions when people objectively consider relevant information, people often do a poor job of using such information or rely on biased perceptions of their capacity to avoid negative outcomes.
For instance, participants in one study read scenarios in which the base rates for several events (car accident, burglary, pet illness, parachute failure, and raffle win) were either high or low and the target was the participant or another person. For every scenario, participants estimated a greater likelihood when the base rate was high than when the base rate was low. However, the estimations for the negative events were consistently lower when the participant was the target of the estimate than when another person was the target (Greening & Chandler, 1997) . On the whole, people inadequately consider base rate information when estimating personal likelihood.
Researchers have identified several cognitive biases that can prompt errors in judgments about base rates. First, people sometimes misjudge probability by overusing the availability heuristic, a shortcut in decision making in which people base judgments of likelihood on how easily they can generate examples of the event. For instance, people often overestimate the likelihood of a fatal plane crash or homicide because they can easily bring to mind poignant instances of these events from the media (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) . The availability heuristic results in overestimation of probabilities for very salient events (often due to recency, personal experience, or media coverage) and underestimation for less salient events, regardless of the actual rate of occurrence. One study demonstrated use of the availability heuristic by objectively measuring "availability" and relating it to perceived probability. The results showed that quicker speed of retrieval of an occurrence of the event corresponded to higher probability judgments for the event (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992) .
Second, people sometimes misjudge probability because they overuse the representativeness heuristic, a shortcut in decision making that involves prototype matching. Specifically, people have prototypes for entities such as events, things, and people, and base judgments of likelihood that a particular example falls within a category on how closely the example matches the prototype. In other words, people perceive their risk for an event as higher when they closely match their stereotypes of someone who would experience that event. For example, people's judgments of their likelihood of being mugged are influenced by how similar they think they are to their stereotype or prototype of the typical mugging victim. The more similar people perceive they are to the stereotype, the more likely they think they will be mugged.
People also hold stereotypes about the likelihood of certain kinds of events. For example, if people believe a negative event is serious, they will also perceive it as rare.
The converse is also true -if people believe an event is rare, they will perceive it as more serious (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986) . Although these beliefs may often be true (e.g., diseases that cause death are usually relatively rare), it is not always the case. For example, the human papilloma virus (HPV) can have serious consequences including infertility and cervical cancer, yet over 40% of college-age women are infected with the virus (Ho, 1998) . Clearly, assumptions about the correlation between severity and risk can be misleading and even dangerous.
Third, people sometimes err in judgments of likelihood based on biased perceptions of control, perceiving that desirable items are more likely to occur when they are controllable than when they are uncontrollable. More specifically, people underestimate their risk for certain events when they believe that they can control the outcome. In addition, people tend to overestimate their personal control (McKenna, 1993; Klein & Kunda, 1993) , leading them to be overly optimistic about their ability to avoid certain negative events. In a study by Greening and Chandler (1997) will not be smokers in the future (McKenna, Warburton, & Winwood, 1993; Lee, 1989 
Avoiding Disappointment as a Source of Judgment Errors
The prior sources of error in likelihood judgment represent cognitive errors that arise from discounting or ignoring information that is hard to comprehend (underusing the base rate), or from overusing common shortcuts in making judgments (the availability and representativeness heuristics), or from attempts to calibrate judgments based on personal information (misperceptions of control). I propose another source of error that is more motivational in flavor arising from a desire to reduce or avoid negative emotions such as disappointment.
Consistent with previous researchers, I view disappointment as the experience of outcomes falling short of expectations ( Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 1999; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 2000) . People feel disappointed about shattered hopes or expectations, not simply about negative outcomes. In this way, disappointment can be distinguished from the similar emotions of sadness, anger, frustration, and regret (Zeelenberg et al., 2000) . Disappointment is specifically associated with absence of a positive, hoped for outcome, whereas sadness, frustration, and anger are generally associated with the presence of a negative outcome (van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 1999) . Disappointment can be further distinguished from its close relative, regret, in that people feel regret over actions and disappointment over outcomes, regardless of the precipitating actions (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998 loss or gain, but also on the possible alternative outcome and the probability of winning (Mellers et al., 1997, Study 1) .
Given that the experience of disappointment depends on the relationship between outcomes and expectations, how can people avoid feeling disappointment? Even at the moment of truth, when all control over outcomes is gone, people can still moderate their disappointment over a negative outcome by lowering their expectations (Carroll, Dockery, & Shepperd, 2003; Shepperd, Oullette, & Fernandez, 1996 , experiments 2 & 3;
see also Gilovich, Kerr, & Medveck, 1993; Sackett, 2002; Sanna, 1999) . This process of bracing for the worst results in pessimistic likelihood estimates at the point of feedback.
For example, students in one study estimated their scores on an exam at four points in time: one month before the exam (Time 1), immediately after the exam (Time 2), one hour before receiving their exam grades (Time 3), and immediately before receiving the grades (Time 4). Students shifted, first from optimism before the exam to realism immediately after the exam was completed. The realism persisted at Time 3, when the students did not expect feedback for another hour. However, when the graded exams were being distributed, the students became pessimistic in their predictions (Shepperd et al., 1996 become more pessimistic about an outcome with severe consequence than they do for one with only mild consequences (Taylor & Shepperd, 1998) . Importance can also be in the eye of the beholder. What seems life-threatening to a high school student, for instance, is usually insignificant to a mature adult. If people see an outcome as unimportant or inconsequential for any reason, they will likely maintain realism or even optimism.
In summary, people experience disappointment when outcomes fall short of expectations. People can avoid disappointment by either changing their outcomes or change their expectations. At the moment of truth, however, people can no longer change the outcome. They can, however, change their expectations, avoiding disappointment by making a pessimistic prediction. However, people will only embrace pessimism to avoid disappointment over outcomes they view as important.
Outcome Likelihood and Bracing
Do people brace more for common events or for rare events? On first blush it might appear that reliance on the availability heuristic would lead people to brace more for common events. As discussed earlier, judgments of frequency are based on how easily examples come to mind. The pervasiveness of common events is likely to facilitate access to examples of common events, prompting greater estimates of frequency reliance on the availability heuristic leads to concern over salient events. For example, people who lived in the days of the influenza virus were certainly aware of the high numbers of fatalities and would likely have rated their chances of contracting the illness as high. People would have heard stories the influenza victims, accounts of how the virus devastated families, and what could happen to them if they did not take the appropriate precautions. However, although this argument is intuitively appealing, in reality the commonality and availability of an event are distinct. As stated earlier, people frequently underestimate the likelihood of very common events. Thus, although some common events are also highly available in memory and the consequences easily imagined, equally often availability and commonality are unrelated.
Availability aside, people may brace more for common events because they have difficulty understanding probabilities. Instead of thinking of likelihood in terms of percentages or probabilities, people may think about likelihood in binary terms --an event will either happen or it won't. Accordingly, for low probability events, people may conclude that because the event is rare, it will not happen. For high probability events, however, people may conclude that the event is inevitable even though there is some chance that it will not happen. Binary thinking would thus lead people to see common events as inevitable and rare events as entirely avoidable.
While some evidence suggests that people will brace more for common events than for rare events, other evidence suggests that people will brace more for rare events than for common events. First, a great deal of research shows that people underestimate the likelihood of common events and overestimate the likelihood of rare events (Fischoff, 1981; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; Pulford & Colman, 1996; Slovic, 1987; Weinstein, & Lyon, 1999; Rothman, Klein, & Weinstein, 1996; Brandstätter, Kühberger, & Schneider, 2002) . For example, people underestimated their risk for common diseases, such as the human papilloma virus and chlamydia, and overestimated their risk for rare diseases such as chronic liver disease and cirrhosis (Rothman et al., 1996 , see also Lichtenstein et al., 1978) . The availability heuristic may account in part for these errors in estimation in that media attention to rare diseases may prompt people to overestimate the base rate and, as a consequence, overestimate their risk (Slovic et al., 1982) . Recent events make this point clear.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, people became afraid to travel by air.
Although, the risk of dying in a plane crash is extremely low, the vivid plane crashes appeared to have created the perception that travel by plane is highly dangerous and that fatal plane crashes are widespread.
Second, the disappointment literature reveals that people feel negative outcomes are particularly aversive when unexpected (Mellers et al., 1997; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002) . The intensity of disappointment depends not only on the negativity of the outcome, but also on the expectations regarding the outcome (van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997), and people would naturally have positive expectations when a negative event is unlikely to occur. In other words, if a negative event has a known base rate of 1%, people will probably be fairly certain that the event will not happen to them. On the other hand, if the negative outcome were to occur, it would be extremely disappointing because it is so rare and unexpected.
In sum, the question of how the commonality of an event moderates bracing has two possible answers. The first, and most intuitive prediction is that people brace more for common negative events. This possibility is supported by the possibility that people think in binary terms rather than considering probabilities and statistics. The second, opposing prediction is less intuitive and proposes that people brace more for rare negative events, and is supported by research on disappointment and probability judgments of common and rare events.
Overview and Hypotheses
The present study examines whether people brace more for common vs.
uncommon negative outcomes by exploring responses to news of a possible financial setback. Specifically, participants believed that either 20% or 80% of students at their university would be affected by an error in the registrar's office that would result in those students receiving an unexpected bill.
Hypothesis 1: I hypothesized that participants in the common risk (80%) condition would estimate their likelihood of receiving a bill as greater than would participants in the rare risk condition (20%). Consequently, I expected to find a main effect of risk condition on risk estimates, with the mean of the common risk condition greater than the mean of the rare risk condition.
Hypothesis 2: In line with the finding that people will be pessimistic about outcomes that are important to them, I hypothesized that, when averaging across the common and rare events, participants who were financially needy would estimate their likelihood of receiving a bill as greater than would participants who were not needy.
Consequently, I expected to find a main effect of need on risk estimates, with the mean of the high need participants greater than the mean of the low need participants.
Hypothesis 3: Among participants receiving news of a rare billing error, I predicted that high need participants would be more likely than low need participants to estimate that they would receive a bill. Among participants receiving news of a common billing error, I predicted that high need and low need participants would not differ in their risk judgments. These sets of means would manifest themselves as an interaction of need and risk level.
Hypothesis 4: Based on the literature on disappointment, I hypothesized that high need participants would be pessimistic in the rare risk condition but would be realistic in the common risk condition. Consequently, I predicted that a dependent t-test comparing the predictions of low need participants would reveal that predictions in the rare risk condition would differ significantly from the 20% baseline, but that predictions in the common risk condition would not differ significantly from the 80% baseline.
Hypothesis 5: I hypothesized that low need participants would be realistic in both the common risk and rare risk conditions. Consequently, I predicted that dependent ttests comparing the predictions of low need participants in the rare and common risk conditions with their respective baselines (either 20% or 80%) would reveal no differences from the baselines.
CHAPTER 2 METHODS

Overview
The methods were adapted from those used Shepperd et al. (2000) . This experiment examined students' reactions to the prospect of a financial loss after learning that a high or low percentage of students would be experience the loss. The greater disappointment experienced when a loss is unexpected led me to predict that people would be more pessimistic about the prospect of a loss, relative to the baseline, when they were told that few students would be affected than when they knew most students would be affected. Moreover, I expected that the effect would be due to greater pessimism on the part of financially needy students.
Participants
Introductory psychology students (N = 234) participated voluntarily as part of three class sections and were randomly assigned to either the high likelihood (80%) of receiving a bill condition or the low likelihood (20%) of receiving a bill condition.
Procedure
Participants in three classes received a description of a recently discovered billing error that would affect either 20% or 80% of the student body (see appendix A).
Participants in each situation learned that students affected by the error would receive a $178 bill in three to four weeks and that failure to pay the bill would result in their records being flagged.
Participants then completed a questionnaire regarding their reactions to the news of the billing error. First, immediately after learning of the billing error, participants responded to five adjectives assessing state anxiety (calm, nervous, anxious, relaxed, worried). Participants responded to each item with how they felt "right now, at this moment," using a four-step scale (1 = not at all; 4 = very much so). These items were summed (after reverse coding) and divided by five to produce a measure of anxiety, range = 1 to 4, M = 2.06, SD = 0.76, Cronbach's α = .85.
Second, participants completed the primary dependent measure, estimating their likelihood of receiving the bill. This item asked participants to use a 0 to 100% scale to estimate the probability that they would receive a bill.
Third, previous findings reveal that only financially needy students braced at the prospect of a financial blow (Shepperd et al., 2000) . As a consequence, in the present study I assessed financial need by having participants complete the same six items assessing financial need used by Shepperd et al. (2000) . Specifically, participants indicated (a) the extent to which they were on a tight financial budget (1 = not on a tight budget; 11 = extremely tight budget), (b) how much difficulty they had making ends meet (1 = little impact; 11 = great impact), (e) how dependent they were on financial aid (1 = not at all dependent; 11 = very dependent), and (f) the extent a bill would affect their budget (1 = not at all; 11 = a great deal). Three of these items (a, b and e) assessed the extent to which participants faced financial challenges and the remaining two items assessed the financial consequences of receiving the bill. I combined the five items to form a single index of need because collectively the five items provided a more complete picture of financial neediness. These five items were summed, after a reverse coding item b, and divided by five to form a single index with a potential range of 1 to 11, M = 5.63, SD = 2.70, Cronbach's α = .93. Of note, the first two items were assessed prior to the description of the billing error, and the last three items were assessed after the description of the error. It is possible that the risk manipulation influenced responses to the last three financial need items. However, an independent t-test revealed no difference between participants in the rare and common event conditions on their responses to these three items, t(178) = 1.43, p > .15. Participants were also asked if they currently were receiving a Bright Futures Scholarship (unique to public universities in Florida), if their tuition was pre-paid, and whether they were paying in-state or out-of-state tuition.
Fourth, participants reported the extent to which they were thinking about the financial difficulties that they would experience in the immediate future as a result of receiving a bill (1 = not at all; 11 = a great deal) and how disappointed they would be if they received a bill (1 = not disappointed; 11 = extremely disappointed). These two items were included to address possible processes mediating any effect of financial need on personal estimates. Finally, participants indicated if they estimated their personal risk to be more or less than the 20% or 80% given in the scenario, why they gave that estimate. They were given several options to choose from, including the option to write a reason other than the ones provided.
Of note, one version of the questionnaire included several additional items.
However, these items did not yield significant results and are irrelevant to the purposes of this study.
CHAPTER 3 RESULTS
From the initial pool of 234 participants I omitted from analyses data from 54 participants because they doubted the authenticity of the billing error, a fact that was evident from their responses to the item, "I estimated that my probability of receiving a bill was…because…". More specifically, I omitted data from 28 participants because they indicated that they knew their bill well and would have noticed the error, 5 participants because they indicated that scholarships would cover all expenses, 8 because they did not believe that a tuition error had occurred, and 13 due to a clerical error that rendered their responses unusable. Of note, including the responses of these participants did not change my basic findings.
As noted earlier, data were collected from three classes. Preliminary analyses including class as a variable in the model revealed no main effects or interactions involving class. Consequently, I collapsed across class in all subsequent analyses.
Risk Estimates
Did risk judgments vary as a function of need and risk level? Figure 1 displays the probability estimates as a function of need (high or low) and risk condition (rare or common). My first three hypotheses were 1) participants in the common risk (80%) condition would estimate their likelihood of receiving a bill as greater than would participants in the rare risk condition (20%), 2) participants who were financially needy would estimate their likelihood of receiving a bill as greater than would participants who were not needy, across risk conditions, and 3) among participants receiving news of a rare billing error, high need participants would be more likely than low need participants to estimate that they would receive a bill, but among participants receiving news of a common billing error, high need and low need participants would not differ in their risk judgments. That is, participants who were financially needy judged they were more likely to receive a bill than did participants who were not financially needy.
Consistent with Hypothesis
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, high need participants made higher estimates than did low need participants regardless of whether the objective likelihood of receiving a bill was high or low. That is, participants who were financially needy judged that they were at greater risk of receiving a bill both when the risk was low and when it was high.
Although this finding is consistent with my prediction for the rare risk condition, in the common risk condition I expected participants to make similar predictions regardless of need.
We examined the first three hypotheses statistically using simultaneous multiple regression procedures in which Need (after centering), Risk (rare or common), and the We tested two additional hypotheses: 4) high need participants would be pessimistic in the rare risk condition but would be realistic in the common risk condition, and 5) low need participants would be realistic in both the common risk and low risk conditions. To test these hypotheses, I compared participants' estimates to the base rates I provided (either 20% or 80%). Figure 2 presents the results of these analyses. In all conditions of need and risk, participants made estimates that differed significantly from the base rate. Specifically, both high need, t(50) = 7.18, p < .0001, and low need, t(40) = 3.25, p < .01, participants in the rare event condition estimated that their likelihood of receiving a bill was greater than the 20% base line they received (M = 49.6, SD = 29.4
and M = 34.2, SD = 27.9, respectively). Likewise, both high need, t ( In sum, participants who were told that their risk of receiving a bill was 80% made higher personal risk estimates than did participants who were told that their risk was 20%. Furthermore, financially needy students in both risk conditions estimated their risk to be higher than did non-needy participants. Finally, participants in the rare risk condition were pessimistic and those in the common risk condition were optimistic, in both cases regardless of need. However, needy students were more pessimistic in the rare risk condition and less optimistic in the common risk condition than the non-needy students.
Are the Results Due to Outliers?
Two possible explanations for the present findings deserve investigation. A first possible explanation for my findings is that they resulted from the responses of a few outlying participants. Because participants could respond using a scale ranging from 0 to 100, there is considerable opportunity for variability in responses and thus a possibility that the findings were the result of outliers. To test this possibility, I conducted a Chisquare analysis of the number of participants who were optimistic, pessimistic, and realistic in each risk condition. Table 1 presents the frequencies of low need and high need participants who were optimistic, realistic, and pessimistic, relative to the baseline of 20% or 80%. I categorized estimates below the baseline (i.e., below 20% for rare event and below 80% for common events) as optimistic, estimates equivalent to the baseline (20% in the rare event condition, 80% in the common event condition) as realistic, and estimates above the baseline as pessimistic. I compared the proportion of low need and high need participants who were optimistic, realistic, and pessimistic separately for the rare and common event conditions using chi-square analyses. The estimate frequencies for needy and non-needy participants differed significantly for rare events, χ were not due to a few outlying responses.
Second, I found that people in the rare event condition were generally pessimistic, estimating a risk greater than 20%, and that participants in the common event condition
were generally optimistic, estimating a risk less than 80%. It is possible that the high level of pessimism for rare events and the high level of optimism for common events is simply the result of participants in the rare condition having greater room to be pessimistic than optimistic, and the participants in the common condition having greater room to be optimistic than pessimistic. For example, in the rare event condition, 
Mediation Analyses
We included several measures of participants' reactions (i.e., anxiety, disappointment, and future thinking) to the possibility of receiving a financial blow with an eye toward investigating possible mediators of the effect of need on personal risk estimates. Using procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) , I first examined whether the three potential mediators predicted participants' predictions. Correlation analyses revealed significant relationships between participants' risk estimates and anxiety, r(180) = .32, p < .0001, disappointment, r(179) = .20, p < .01, and future thinking, r(180) = .25, p < .001, indicating that participants who felt more anxious, expected to experience more disappointment, and were thinking more about the future made greater risk estimates. Furthermore, financial need correlated significantly with anxiety, r(180) = .40, p < .0001, disappointment, r(179) = .68, p < .0001, and future thinking, r(180) = .79, p < .0001, indicating that needy students, compared to non-needy students were feeling more anxious, predict that they would experience greater disappointment if they received a bill, and were thinking more about the future consequences of receiving a bill.
We then conducted three separated regression analyses, one each for the three possible mediators. In each case, the mediator was entered into the model first, followed by need, risk condition and the need by risk condition interaction term. In all three cases, when the mediator was added, need no longer predicted participants' risk estimates, all
Fs(1, 175) < 1, all ps > .35, but the mediator did, all Fs(1, 175) > 8.13, p < .01. Of note, the mediators in no way mediated the effect of risk condition on participants' estimates.
Risk condition remained unchanged as a significant predictor of participants' risk judgments in all three cases, all Fs(1, 175) > 11.16, p < .01. The fact that all three variables completed mediated the effect of need on risk judgments suggests that the three mediators are all tapping a common underlying process. 
CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine whether people brace differently when an event is common vs. rare. I predicted that participants would only brace for rare events, displaying pessimism about the likelihood of receiving a bill, and that only participants for whom a bill was particularly consequential would brace. The data generally supported the predictions, although some findings were unexpected.
Looking first at the effect of risk level (Hypothesis 1), participants who believed that 20% of students would receive a bill made lower personal predictions than did participants who believed that 80% of students would be affected. Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 2 and previous findings that people are pessimistic about outcomes that are important to them, participants high in financial need made higher risk estimates than did low need participants.
Comparing risk estimates to the base line of 20% or 80% yielded an unexpected pattern of results. In the rare risk condition, I predicted that only high need participants would be pessimistic. However, the results show participants were pessimistic, regardless of need, about the likelihood of a rare event. Importantly, high need participants were more pessimistic than were low need participants. Nevertheless, low need participants were also bracing in their estimates. In the common risk condition, I
predicted that all participants would be realistic about their risk of receiving a bill.
However, the results show that participants were actually optimistic, regardless of need, about the likelihood of a common event. Further analyses confirmed that these patterns were not a result of outliers.
Possible Explanations
How do I explain this pattern of optimism and pessimism? One possible explanation for the findings is that participants who were low in financial need were simply less engaged in the procedures because the consequences were unimportant to them, resulting in muted effects of risk level on their estimates. Although presumably low need participants saw the event as less important than did high need participants, the results do not point to this difference as the sole player in my findings. Only in the rare risk condition could I describe low need participants' estimates as a "muted" version of the effect found with high need participants. In the common risk condition, participants low in need actually deviated more from the base line than did high need participants, ruling out the possibility of a "muted effects" explanation.
A second possible explanation lies in the finding that people consistently overestimate the risk of rare events and underestimate the risk of common events (Fischoff, 1981; Johnson &Tversky, 1983; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; Pulford & Colman, 1996; Slovic, 1987; Weinstein, & Lyon, 1999; Rothman, Klein, & Weinstein, 1996; Brandstätter, Kühberger, & Schneider, 2002) . This research suggests that when people do not know the base rate for an event, they make predictions based on available knowledge and what seems reasonable. People often have some sense of the true base rate, but this sense is imperfect. As a consequence, they underestimate how rare the rare events are and overestimate how common the common events are. If they knew the true base rates, their estimates would conform more to the base rates. Thus, perhaps students simply overestimated the likelihood of receiving a bill when the risk was 20% and underestimated when the risk was 80% because they were making their best estimates based on their available knowledge of the event. However, this explanation falls apart in light of the fact that the participants in this study had knowledge of the exact base rate. Moreover, analyses of the distribution of participants who were optimistic, realistic, and pessimistic confirms that participants were not merely overestimating their risk when the event was rare and underestimating their risk when the event was common.
Third, perhaps participants were simply using the availability heuristic when making their estimates. With the availability heuristic, judgments of likelihood are based on how easily examples come to mind. Although available information such as past billing problems with the registrar's office may account for the differences in estimates between needy and non-needy participants, it does not explain the fact that both needy and non-needy participants overestimated their risk for a rare outcome and underestimated their risk for a common outcome. Alternatively participants may have employed the availability heuristic in conjunction with an anchoring and adjustment process. Specifically, participants may have used the base rates provided to them then adjusted their estimates from the base rates based on their experience. Thus, both needy and non-needy participants may have had some experience with billing problems and so they adjusted their estimates somewhat from the base rate. Prior research, however, has found that needy students experience more billing problems than do non-needy students (Shepperd et al., 2000) . The greater experience may have prompted greater upward adjustment from 20% in the rare risk condition and less adjustment from 80% in the common risk condition. Although this explanation seems plausible, it does not explain why participants, particularly participants high in need, supplied estimates below 80% in the common risk condition. Fourth, perhaps participants had difficulty understanding the probabilities of 20% and 80%. Instead of judging their risk in terms of percentages, perhaps participants were thinking in binary terms, such that they interpreted a 20% risk as "I won't receive a bill" and an 80% risk as "I will receive a bill." Again, this explanation is easily refuted. If, in fact, participants were thinking in binary terms, they would have made estimates of 0% and 100%. Examination of the data reveals that less than 11% of participants made an estimate of 0%, and fewer than 6% of participants made estimates of 100%, hardly evidence for a binary thinking explanation.
A final possible explanation for the findings is that the estimates were randomly distributed and that the distribution of estimates reflects nothing more than people supplying estimates where they had the most room to estimate. Thus, participants were pessimistic in the rare event condition because they had more room to be pessimistic than optimistic. Conversely, people were optimistic in the common event condition because they had more room to be optimistic. As I noted earlier, the distribution of responses does not rule out this explanation. However, it is difficult to conceive why financial need would differentially impact random responses. Thus, although chance may play a role in the results, it seems that chance cannot fully account for all of the findings. In addition, the distribution of optimistic, pessimistic, and realistic responses does not support an explanation of the findings as due to outliers.
The Role of Disappointment
I proposed at the outset of this study that differences in people's risk estimates for rare and common events would result from differences in their expectations of disappointment. Previous studies show that people experience disappointment to the extent that their expectations exceed their outcomes (van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997) .
People can avoid feeling disappointed in one of two ways: a) improve outcomes, or b) lower expectations. In this study, the outcome, a bill of $178, was out of the participants' control. Therefore, keeping their expectations of a positive outcome low was the only option available to mitigate possible disappointment. Thus, perhaps participants were pessimistic about rare events to avoid being caught off guard. In contrast, perhaps participants did not need to be pessimistic about common events, for which their expectations were low from the start. Do my results support this proposal? Admittedly, the findings are mixed in their support for the role of disappointment. On the one hand, participants' reported expectations of feeling disappointment did not mediate the effect of risk condition on personal estimates. In fact, expected disappointment seemed to be a facet of financial need rather than a response to the risk manipulation. Thus, concerns with disappointment did not differentiate risk estimates for rare and common events.
On the other hand, a close look at the pattern of risk estimates may bring disappointment back into the picture. Ignoring, for a moment, participants' self-reported expectations for disappointment, the pattern of results conceptually supports the initial predictions. Concerning rare events, participants were pessimistic across levels of financial need, with high need participants displaying stronger pessimism than low need participants. Although I initially predicted realism from low need participants, their slight pessimism is understandable when one takes into account that the bill was for $178, a considerable sum of money for a college student. In other words, perhaps all participants wanted to be prepared to some degree when the bill could catch them off guard.
Concerning common events, participants were optimistic across levels of financial need, with low need participants displaying stronger optimism than high need participants. Although I initially predicted realism from all participants in the common risk condition, varying degrees of optimism are not inconsistent with an explanation of disappointment's role in risk predictions. In this explanation, I propose that people do not want to be surprised by a negative event. When the baseline is high enough, people no longer need to embrace a pessimistic outlook to prepare themselves for disappointment because reality does that for them. In fact, people may even become slightly optimistic, taking advantage of the affective benefits of a positive outlook while still remaining relatively prepared for the worst. For example, participants who estimated 70% in the common risk condition may have concluded that this estimate sufficiently prepared them for the possibility of receiving a bill while offering the subjective comfort that their risk, while high, was still lower than the risk of others. In light of this adjustment to my original model of disappointment and risk, participants' estimates in the common risk condition fit quite well. Participants high in need sacrificed only a small degree of "preparedness" and became only slightly optimistic, while low need participants, for whom the consequences of the bill would be minor, adopted a relatively highly optimistic outlook.
In sum, a number of explanations fail to account for the results of this study. First, low need participants did not display a muted version of the high need participants' pattern of estimates. Second, participants did not simply overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probabilities. Third, participants were not responding to the salience of the bill. Fourth, participants did not interpret their risk of receiving a bill in binary terms. Fifth, the pattern of results was not due the presence of outliers. Sixth, although initial analyses suggests that the distribution of estimates might simply arise from participants were responding where there was the most room to respond, this explanation does not explain why participants high in need rated their risk as greater than did participants low in need. Finally, I propose an explanation based on the differing role of disappointment in predictions for rare and common events. Although this explanation is tentative and not without inconsistencies (i.e., the self-reported expectations of disappointment), it does capture the complete picture of my findings in a way that other explanations fail to do.
Limitations and Implications
The present study addressed a previously unexplored question about bracing for bad news. Although the results begin to paint a picture of the role of commonality and importance in people's perceptions of risk, I acknowledge several limitations of this study. As just discussed, the role of disappointment requires clarification in order to form conclusions about why people brace differently for common and rare events. I used a single item measure of expected disappointment, and this single item may have been insufficient to capture the complex experience of affective prediction. In fact, disappointment mediated the effect of financial need, suggesting that my measure of disappointment (along with anxiety and thoughts about the future) may have tapped something more related to importance than to an expected affective experience.
Examining disappointment more fully would be an important goal for future research in this area.
In this study, financial need served as my measure of the importance of consequences. Although I believe that need was a valid measure of importance, future studies should seek to replicate my findings using an importance manipulation.
Furthermore, this study used 20% and 80% as the definitions of rare and common, respectively. Commonality is a relative concept, and one could make the argument that 20% isn't very rare, or that 80% isn't common enough. I chose 20% and 80% for practical reasons, and it is the job of future research to determine the generality of my findings with varying degrees of commonality. No. However, it seems possible that each form of unreality serves the purpose at hand.
Conclusion
